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Abstract
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are usually launched through the botnet, an “army”
of compromised nodes hidden in the network. Inferential tools for DDoS mitigation should accordingly
enable an early and reliable discrimination of the normal users from the compromised ones. Unfortu-
nately, the recent emergence of attacks performed at the application layer has multiplied the number of
possibilities that a botnet can exploit to conceal its malicious activities. New challenges arise, which
cannot be addressed by simply borrowing the tools that have been successfully applied so far to earlier
DDoS paradigms. In this work, we offer basically three contributions: i) we introduce an abstract model
for the aforementioned class of attacks, where the botnet emulates normal traffic by continually learning
admissible patterns from the environment; ii) we devise an inference algorithm that is shown to provide
a consistent (i.e., converging to the true solution as time elapses) estimate of the botnet possibly hidden
in the network; and iii) we verify the validity of the proposed inferential strategy over real network
traces.
Index Terms
Distributed Denial-of-Service, DDoS, Cyber-security, Signal Processing for Network Security.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Cyber-security ranks among the biggest challenges of modern times. Whether we are talking
of phishing, website sabotages, or even of terrorist attacks, protecting our digital lives is an issue
A short and limited version of this work appears in the conference publication [1].
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2of paramount importance. Networks, and especially the Internet, became the natural attackers’
habitat to hide a broad variety of threats. For instance, a dangerous attack to a powerful target
site (e.g., a big e-commerce portal) is often launched through a series of apparently innocuous
attacks to some powerless, but most vulnerable, sites (e.g., some personal computers).
One of the most popular threats is the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, which can be broadly
categorized as a volumetric attack, where the target destination is overwhelmed by a huge number
of requests, eventually leading to the impossibility of serving any of the users. In particular, with
a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, such a huge number of requests is produced in parallel by a net
of robots (the botnet). According to one of the classical DDoS representations, a relatively large
ensemble of machines (the bots or zombie “army”), acts cooperatively under the supervision of
one or more coordinators (the botmasters). The bots may be either themselves malicious users
acting consciously, or they may be legitimate users that have been preliminarily infected, (e.g.,
by warms and/or Trojans).
The existence itself of an anomalous request rate is essentially uncovered, and, hence, its
detection is not a big deal. The main challenge is instead ascertaining whether the anomaly
is caused by a DDoS attack, and, if so, performing a correct/early identification of the botnet
hidden in the network. These operations are crucial to achieve successful DDoS mitigation, since
discriminating legitimate from malicious users would allow the destination to ban the latter,
without denying the service to the former. Providing inference solutions to botnet discovery and
identification is the main subject of this work.
A. Related Work
The literature about DDoS attacks is rich, and we refer the Reader to the survey in [2] as a
useful entry-point. The earliest DoS paradigms (see, e.g., TCP SYN flooding), relied on specific
protocols’ vulnerabilities, and were characterized by the repetition of one (or few) requests with a
huge rate. In this situation, the single source of the attack can be identified by simply computing
its unusually large request rate.
The distributed variants of such attacks exploit basically the same kind of vulnerabilities and
repetition schemes, but for the fact that the large request rate is now obtained by aggregating
many small individual bot rates. This notwithstanding, in such attacks, the bots can be still
identified at a single-user level. Indeed, normal traffic patterns are typically characterized by a
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3certain degree of innovation, while the repetition scheme implicitly emphasizes the bot character.
In fact, several useful inferential strategies have been proposed for such kind of DDoS attacks,
see [2] for a comparative summary.
Recently, the new class of application-layer DDoS attacks is emerging as one of the most
powerful threats [3]–[6]. In such attacks, the malicious traffic patterns are disguised as normal
ones by leveraging the many possibilities offered at the application layer (for instance, when
surfing through a website, more and more web-pages are likely to be explored as time elapses).
By assigning a sufficient degree of variability to each individual bot’s pattern, identification
strategies based on single-user inspection become harmless. Building on such new possibilities,
in this work we shall introduce a formal model for DDoS attacks where the botnet gets at its
disposal a certain emulation dictionary to build the traffic patterns.
A number of intriguing questions arise. Despite the strong power given to the attacker, is it
still possible to consistently unveiling the presence of a botnet? If so, which are the pertinent
inferential strategies, and which the performance limits? Which is the fundamental trade-off
between the botnet learning ability and the inference performance?
B. Relevant Inferential Tools and Methods
The inferential strategies available in the literature are not conceived to manage the class
of DDoS attacks with increasing emulation dictionary [2]. While in principle it is possible to
generalize and take inspiration from some of these strategies, plug-in solutions to our problem
are currently unavailable. Therefore, new inferential solutions must be conceived.
Classical parametric statistical methods (e.g., maximum likelihood, Neyman-Pearson tests)
typically offer a high degree of tractability, analytical results and performance guarantees, but
they are suited to those situations where a detailed knowledge of the models is available [7]–
[10], a condition that is far from being verified in our setting. As a result, the aforementioned
benefits are often paid in the coin of scarce robustness, sensible performance loss, low degree
of versatility and adaptation.
In contrast, fully data-driven techniques (e.g., machine learning) do not require a detailed
knowledge of the underlying models, and provide a high degree of versatility, with these advan-
tages being often paid in the coin of lack of analytical results and performance guarantees, hard
physical interpretation of the metrics, heavy algorithm-tuning when parameters change.
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4In order to partly circumvent the limitations of both approaches, as well as to retain some
advantages thereof, in the present work we follow some emerging trends in signal processing for
network cyber-security applications, which lie somehow in-between parametric and fully data-
driven techniques. As notable examples, we mention: sparsity-aware algorithms for unveiling
traffic volume anomalies [11]–[13]; universal algorithms for tracing information flows across
the network [14]–[19]; hypothesis testing in the presence of adversaries that can corrupt the
data, when the statistical hypotheses are specified only through training data [20]. Inspired by a
common underlying philosophy, such works suggest to pursue the following principled approach:
i) focus on minimal-and-realistic physical assumptions; ii) envisage physically-meaningful de-
scriptive indicators arising from the modeling assumptions; iii) devise consequently an inference
strategy.
The DDoS class considered in this work builds upon and generalizes some dangerous threats
that have been recently documented in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to provide a systematic analysis and to devise suitable countermeasures for such
kind of attacks. As a future research step, an interesting extension would be optimizing (from
the attacker’s viewpoint, i.e., playing the bad guy role) the kind of DDoS attack. This approach
would naturally lead to an adversarial perspective where the DDoS and the botnet-identification
strategies should be optimized jointly, by looking for equilibrium solutions aimed at managing
the attacker’s and defender’s conflicting requirements [21].
C. Main Result
This work deals with the design and analysis of inference strategies aimed at identifying
a botnet in the context of distributed denial-of-service attacks. In our setting: i) the network
analyst collects traffic patterns from across the network, and has access to the message content;
ii) the meaning of the messages produced by an individual user provides no special information
about its nature, legitimate, or malicious; and iii) no specific assumptions are made about the
characterization of the traffic patterns of a normal user. In this respect, the inference strategies
proposed in this work are non-parametric.
Starting from the attacks documented in the literature, we introduce a formal model for
randomized DDoS attacks with increasing emulation dictionary, which is defined by the following
main features: i) the botnet emulates the normal traffic patterns by gleaning admissible messages
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5from an emulation dictionary; and ii) the botnet is given the strong power of learning an
emulation dictionary that becomes richer and richer as time elapses, so as to guarantee a sufficient
variability across messages. In order to quantify the botnet learning ability, in this work we
introduce the Emulation Dictionary Rate (EDR), namely, the increase of dictionary cardinality
per unit time.
Notably, the considered class of DDoS attacks is more general and powerful than many attacks
documented in the literature. The assumption of such great power in the attacker’s hands might
perhaps look overly pessimistic. At the same time, a worst-case analysis is perfectly suited to
security applications, and allows getting important insights as regards the botnet identifiability
under challenging operational conditions.
The fundamental descriptive indicator employed in this work to ascertain the nature of network
users is the Message Innovation Rate (MIR), namely, the number of distinct messages per unit
time, transmitted by a given group of users. The relevance of the MIR for botnet identification
purposes arises since, in view of the coordination in the DDoS attack, the users belonging to a
botnet are expected to exhibit a smaller degree of innovation than normal users, which act by
their own nature independently one each other.
Our first contribution determines the MIR for a botnet B, with either deterministic or Poisson
transmission scheduling. Denoting by λB the transmission rate corresponding to the overall
transmission activity in B, and by α the EDR, we show that the MIR converges in probability
to the following innovation rate (Theorem 1):
R(α, λB) =
αλB
α + λB
(1)
Our second contribution consists of devising an algorithm that, under a suitable Botnet Identifi-
cation Condition (BIC), guarantees that the botnet hidden in the network is correctly identified
as time elapses (Theorem 2).
Finally, as a third contribution, all of the aforementioned theoretical results are tested and
validated over real network traces; the experimental outcomes are definitely encouraging.
Notation. P[·] and E[·] denote the probability and the expectation operators, respectively. Given
an ensemble of random variables Xt (with either continuous or discrete index t), the notation
Xt
p−→ X means that Xt converges in probability to X as t→∞ [22].
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6II. NETWORK ACTIVITY INDICATORS
We start by introducing the basic quantities that will be used to describe the network activity.
The first quantity relates to the transmission activity of the network users. Each user employs a
certain scheduling, which is identified by the transmission epochs of its own messages. More in
general, for any given subnet S of the network, we can define the aggregate pattern that comprises
all (ordered) transmission epochs of the users belonging to S, formally: TS(1), TS(2), . . . , where
TS(i) is the i-th (random) transmission epoch of users belonging to S. Likewise, the pattern of an
individual user u becomes: Tu(1), Tu(2), . . . , where, with a slight abuse of notation (which will
be used throughout the work), we have written u in lieu of {u}. The total number of transmissions
occurred in S, up to a given (deterministic) time t is denoted by NS(t) , |{i : TS(i) ≤ t}|.
As an indicator of the transmission activity, we introduce the empirical transmission rate at
time t, namely,
λˆS(t) ,
NS(t)
t
(2)
Whenever a limiting rate (as t goes to infinity) is meaningfully defined, it will be denoted by
λS, which will be simply referred to as the transmission rate of subnet S.
Two examples of transmission schedulings which are relevant for our DDoS application, and
which admit a limiting rate, are the synchronous, constant-rate transmission scheduling, and the
independent Poisson scheduling. In the former case, all users transmit synchronously, and the
(constant) interval between two transmissions has duration 1/λ. The empirical transmission rate
clearly obeys: λˆS(t)→ λ |S| as t→∞. In the latter case, the transmission pattern of user u is a
Poisson process with rate λu, and the processes are mutually independent. Since the aggregate
of independent Poisson processes is still a Poisson process, as a straightforward application of
the (weak) law of large numbers, we have [23]: λˆS(t)
p−→∑u∈S λu.
As a second indicator of the network activity, we define a quantity that relates to the content of
the messages sent by network users. We are interested in the new messages that are incrementally
produced by the users during their activities, namely, in a Message Innovation Rate (MIR). In
order to obtain a formal definition of the MIR, let DS(t) denote the empirical dictionary composed
by the distinct messages sent, up to time t, by users within S. For the sake of clarity, we remark
that, if the same message is sent, e.g., twice, from users belonging to S, it appears only once in
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7the dictionary DS(t). The empirical Message Innovation Rate (MIR) is:
ρˆS(t) ,
|DS(t)|
t
(3)
In particular, if ρˆS(t)
p−→ ρS, the limiting value ρS will be simply referred to as the MIR of
subnet S.
III. RANDOMIZED DDOS WITH EMULATION DICTIONARY
A botnet Btot, composed by Btot malicious nodes, sends messages to the destination under
attack in order to saturate its resources. The botnet mimics normal patterns by picking messages
from an emulation dictionary, which is learned continually (i.e., its cardinality increases with
time), in order to ensure that a reasonable innovation rate can be sustained. Such a dictionary
construction can occur in many different ways. For instance, by means of one or more powerful
botmasters, the botnet might be able to perform an on-line monitoring of normal activities
from across the network. From such a monitoring, sequences of messages corresponding to
normal patterns of activity are collected, allowing the construction of a dictionary of admissible
messages.
Let E (t) be the (common) dictionary available at time t to all botnet members. We assume
that the number of messages available for emulation grows, asymptotically, in a linear fashion.
Therefore, it makes sense to introduce the Emulation Dictionary Rate (EDR) as:
α , lim
t→∞
|E (t)|
t
(4)
Given the emulation dictionary, the botnet has clearly many ways to build the traffic patterns. At
one extreme, the botmaster disseminates Btot disjoint (say, equal-sized) portions of E (t) through
the botnet. Then, each bot builds its traffic pattern by scanning, in a sequential fashion, its
portion of the emulation dictionary. Such a scheme would clearly maximize the independence
among the bots. With this policy, the problem would become equivalent to the case that each
bot owns a distinct emulation dictionary with EDR equal to α/Btot. However, since Btot must
be large, it is unrealistic to assume that a botmaster can learn so many patterns to build Btot
distinct dictionaries that are in turn so rich to guarantee a credible emulation. Therefore, in the
case of disjoint dictionaries, the number of distinct messages available to a single bot would be
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8typically small, implying a suspiciously high degree of replication, which would make the bots
easily identifiable by single-user inspection.
At the other extreme, each bot might simply use all messages contained in E (t). Clearly, such
scheme maximizes the innovation of each individual bot, but also maximizes the dependence
inside the botnet. By inspection of the messages sequentially sent by two or more bots, a traffic
analyst would recognize an anomalous behavior.
We hence assume that the attacker has devised some intermediate strategy to circumvent the
aforementioned issues. We introduce a class of randomized DDoS attacks, where a bot that
intends to transmit at time t picks a message from the available emulation dictionary E (t), and
sends such a message to the destination. The message is chosen uniformly at random, so that
the probability of a particular message is simply 1/|E (t)|.
The corresponding evolution of the empirical dictionaries, for any subnet B of Btot, is easily
obtained as follows. Given the empirical dictionary DB(t), the empirical dictionary DB(t + τ)
is obtained by adding the distinct messages not contained in DB(t), which have been selected
during the interval τ by the bots belonging to B.
We stress that the scheme examined here is not the only one. Other possible attacks include:
purely volumetric DDoS; strategies using disjoint dictionaries; hybrid strategies using groups
of disjoint dictionaries disseminated through the network. While in this work we focus on a
specific class of DDoS attacks, our treatment (as will be clear from the forthcoming analysis)
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate extensions to many interesting scenarios.
A. Characterization of the Botnet Message Innovation Rate
Let us preliminarily introduce the following function:
R(α, λ) , αλ
α + λ
(5)
Our first result provides a closed-form expression for the MIR of a botnet.
THEOREM 1 (Botnet MIR). Consider a botnet Btot launching a DDoS attack, where the node
transmission policies are either synchronous with constant transmission rate, or independent
Poisson processes, with rates λu, for u ∈ Btot. Consider a subset of the botnet B ⊆ Btot. Let
E (t) be the emulation dictionary available to the botnet, with emulation dictionary rate α, and
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9let DB(t) be the empirical dictionary of the subnet B at time t. Then, the message innovation
rate of B is:
|DB(t)|
t
p−→ ρB = R(α, λB) (6)
where λB =
∑
u∈B λu is the aggregate transmission rate of the considered botnet subset.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
REMARK I. From (5) and (6) we see that increasing the EDR α and/or the transmission rate λ
corresponds to increasing the MIR. Besides, the MIR is always smaller1 than min(α, λ), which
makes sense, since the number of new messages can exceed neither the number of messages
in the emulation dictionary (R(α, λ) ≤ α), nor the overall number of transmitted messages
(R(α, λ) ≤ λ). Notably, the quantity min(α, λ) is the MIR corresponding to a practical scheme
where the patterns are obtained by taking sequentially (in a deterministic way) the messages of
the emulation dictionary. With such a scheme, if α > λ, a new message can be always found
in E (t), and the maximum rate of distinct messages is λ. Likewise, if λ > α, all messages in
E (t) can be selected, along with some unavoidable repetitions, and the maximum rate of distinct
messages is α.
REMARK II. As α goes to infinity, the MIR converges to λ. In fact, as the number of messages
in the emulation dictionary goes to infinity, each transmission would correspond with high
probability to a new message, and the MIR will eventually reach the maximum allowable value
λ. Likewise, as λ goes to infinity, we see that the MIR converges to α. In fact, as the number
of sent messages goes to infinity, the emulation dictionary is completely spanned, and the MIR
will eventually saturate to its maximum allowable value α.
REMARK III. The MIR is symmetric in α and λ, implying that both quantities, even if they have
a completely different practical meaning, play the same role as regards their effect on the MIR.
In particular, we can write R(α, λ) = (1/α + 1/λ)−1, which reveals that the rate R(α, λ) can
be represented as the inverse of a time interval given by the sum of the average time between
two messages available in the emulation dictionary, 1/α, and the average time between two
transmissions, 1/λ.
1For x > 0 and y > 0, one has x/(x+ y) ≤ 1.
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REMARK IV. For strictly positive α and λ we have:
R(α, λ1) +R(α, λ2) > R(α, λ1 + λ2) (7)
The latter inequality can be straightforwardly checked by exploiting the definition of R(α, λ)
in (5). More interestingly, such inequality can be explained in the light of the physical interpre-
tation of Theorem 1. In fact, the LHS in (7) corresponds to the MIR of a botnet made of two
subnets: i) featuring transmission rates λ1 and λ2, respectively, and ii) picking messages from
two disjoint dictionaries, each one with EDR equal to α. In contrast, the RHS corresponds to the
MIR of a botnet made of two subnets, still featuring transmission rates λ1 and λ2, but picking
messages from a common dictionary with EDR α. Hence, the lower bound follows.
REMARK V. Our focus is on genuinely-distributed DoS attacks where the number of bots is
large, and the transmission rate of each bot is not anomalous. Let us now consider a different
DDoS strategy. Assuming for simplicity that all bots have unitary transmission rates, the MIR
of user u, and the MIR of the whole botnet will be, respectively,
ρu =
α
α +Btot
, ρBtot =
∑
u∈Btot
ρu =
αBtot
α +Btot
, (8)
where the first relationship follows from Theorem 1, while the second relationship follows from
disjointness of the emulation (and, hence, of the empirical) dictionaries. For our coordinated
DDoS with common emulation dictionary, Theorem 1 gives:
ρu =
α
α + 1
, ρBtot =
αBtot
α +Btot
. (9)
Notably, the rightmost formulas in (8) and (9) reveal that the MIR for the case of disjoint
dictionaries is the same as the MIR of a botnet using a common emulation dictionary. On the
other hand, the leftmost formulas in (8) and (9) reveal that the MIR of a single bot for the
case of disjoint dictionaries is approximately Btot times smaller than the MIR of a single bot for
the case of a common emulation dictionary. Such a reduced degree of innovation matches the
observations reported below (4), concerning the flaws of deterministic DDoS attacks based on
disjoint emulation dictionaries.
REMARK VI. Assume that the traffic analyst must estimate α based on the patterns collected from
a certain subnet S. From (5) and (6), we have α = λS ρS/(λS − ρS). Accordingly, a reasonable
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estimator of α can be obtained by replacing ρ and λ with their empirical counterparts, yielding:
αˆS(t) ,
λˆS(t) ρˆS(t)
λˆS(t)− ρˆS(t)
(10)
In view of Theorem 1, such estimator converges in probability to α as t goes to infinity, for any
S ⊆ Btot.
In contrast, when dealing with normal users, such an interpretation fails in general, since:
i) a limiting value α does not necessarily exist, and ii) the generative mechanism of normal
patterns is not necessarily interpreted in terms of random picking from an emulation dictionary.
Nevertheless, the quantity αˆS(t) can be meaningfully defined also for arbitrary subnets (i.e.,
composed also, or even exclusively, by normal users), since it represents the ratio between
the empirical rate of “distinct” messages ρˆS(t), and the empirical rate of “repeated” messages
λˆS(t)− ρˆS(t), scaled2 by the empirical transmission rate λˆS(t). Such an interpretation is useful
since it is now independent from the particular model adopted (transmission scheduling, botnet
or normal behavior, etc.). In the following, even when dealing with arbitrary subnets, we shall
loosely refer to αˆS(t) as the empirical, or estimated EDR.
Finally, exploiting (5) and (10), the empirical MIR ρˆS(t), for an arbitrary subnet S, can be
expressed as:
ρˆS(t) = R(αˆS(t), λˆS(t)) (11)
IV. BOTNET IDENTIFICATION CONDITION
The coordination implied in the distributed DoS attack introduces some correlation between
the empirical dictionaries of the bots, due to the common emulation dictionary where messages
are selected. In contrast, the empirical dictionaries of two normal users are expected to be weakly
correlated, due to independence among their activities. Likewise, the empirical dictionaries of a
bot and of a normal user are expected to be weakly correlated, since the network employed by
the botmaster to acquire the emulation dictionary is usually not part of the network monitored
by the traffic analyst.
On the other hand, even in the presence of normal (thus, independent) users, it is realistic to
assume a certain degree of physiological correlation among the users’ activities. Distinct users
2The scaling simply corresponds to expressing the result on a per-time-unit basis, rather than on a per-transmission basis.
July 2, 2018 DRAFT
12
can reasonably share parts of their dictionaries, e.g., their surfing activities might partly overlap,
due to common interests, popular web-pages, peculiar structure of the destination of interest,
etc. Similar considerations apply when dealing with a subset of the botnet and a subnet made
only of normal users.
Given the very limited amount of information and assumptions we made, and according to the
above discussion, any meaningful strategy to discriminate a normal from a malicious behavior,
cannot but be based on the degree of dependence among the users. In our setting, a convenient
way to measure the degree of dependence is provided by the empirical message innovation
rate in (3). However, the mere availability of a good network indicator does not provide a
quantitative way to discriminate normal users from bots. In order to design an algorithm for
botnet identification, we need to define a proper identification threshold. To this aim, we can
use as reference case for a malicious behavior, the MIR corresponding to the activity performed
by a botnet. In order to understand how such operation can be implemented, let us start by
considering the case that we must decide whether users 1 and 2 belong to a botnet. Assume
for now that the empirical EDRs of the two users obtained through (10) are comparable (the
explicit dependence on t being suppressed, for ease of notation, here and in the forthcoming
discussion):
αˆ1 ≈ αˆ2 ≈ αˆ. (12)
When both users belong to a botnet, in view of Theorem 1, for t large enough we can write:
ρˆ{1,2} ≈ R(αˆ, λˆ1 + λˆ2) , ρˆbot. (13)
Moreover, irrespectively of the users’ nature, the empirical MIR of the aggregate subnet {1, 2}
can be upper bounded by the MIR corresponding to disjoint dictionaries, namely,
ρˆ{1,2} ≤ ρˆ1 + ρˆ2 = R(αˆ1, λˆ1) +R(αˆ2, λˆ2) , ρˆsum
≈ R(αˆ, λˆ1) +R(αˆ, λˆ2), (14)
where the second equality follows from (11), while the approximate equality follows from (12).
Since from (7) we know that ρˆbot < ρˆsum, it makes sense to introduce a threshold lying between
the two points ρˆbot and ρˆsum, formally, for  ∈ (0, 1):
ρˆbot < γ = ρˆbot + (ρˆsum − ρˆbot) < ρˆsum. (15)
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When the two users belong to a botnet, from (13) we see that, for large t, the empirical MIR
ρˆ{1,2} converges to the value ρˆbot. On the other hand, using Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that
ρˆsum − ρˆbot converges in probability to a positive quantity, which implies that, for any  > 0, as
time elapses, the empirical MIR will stay sooner (higher ) or later (lower ) below the threshold
γ, yielding:
1 AND 2 are bots⇒ ρˆ{1,2} < γ (16)
Consider now the case that at least one user is normal. Were the dictionaries of the two users
perfectly disjoint, we would clearly observe, for any  ∈ (0, 1), that ρˆ{1,2} ≈ ρˆsum > γ. However,
we already noticed that some correlation is expected to exist even among normal users, or among
normal users and bots. It is also natural to assume that such a correlation is weaker than the
correlation exhibited by groups of bots, since the latter are choosing their messages from one
and the same underlying dictionary.3 Accordingly, we might expect that, when at least one user
is normal, for sufficiently small , the empirical MIR still stays above the threshold, namely:
1 OR 2 are normal⇒ ρˆ{1,2} > γ (17)
In summary, if the empirical MIR stays below γ, we can declare that the two users form a
botnet, otherwise, we can declare that at least one user is normal.
Two main points emerge. First, the essential feature enabling a successful discrimination is the
assumption in (17), which accordingly plays the role of a Botnet Identification Condition (BIC).
Second, the determination of the threshold γ relies on a tuning parameter , which is in principle
related to the intrinsic (and unknown) properties of the normal traffic patterns. Remarkably, the
experimental study conducted in the forthcoming Sec. VI will show clearly that: i) the BIC
can be safely used, and ii) the choice of  is by no means critical, even in the non-parametric
scenario where no prior information about the normal users’ behavior is available.
Unfortunately, all that glitters is not gold. There is an important complication that has been
deliberately overlooked so far. According to the above explanation, we need to compare the
empirical MIR to the MIR of a reference botnet. However, a botnet is characterized by a common
underlying EDR α, while in practice we shall typically have αˆ1 6= αˆ2 (especially when at least one
user is normal), implying that the approximation in (12) is unsupported. One approach could
3 In making such assumption, we imply that the specific mechanism used to build normal patterns has a minor influence.
July 2, 2018 DRAFT
14
be that of discarding ab initio the botnet hypothesis whenever αˆ1 and αˆ2 are too dissimilar.
The qualification of being “too dissimilar” translates into the appearance of some extra tuning
parameter, possibly depending on time, which we want definitely to avoid.
Another possibility is clearly that of choosing as reference EDR some intermediate value
comprised between αˆ1 and αˆ2. In this connection, we remark that the naı¨ve choice of the
arithmetic average does not work for the following reason. It can be simply verified that, in
general, there exist values of λ1, λ2, α1, α2 ∈ R+ for which R(λ1, α1) +R(λ2, α2) < R(λ1 +
λ2, 1/2(α1 + α2)), implying that the empirical MIR, even for the case of disjoint dictionaries,
is not necessarily greater than the MIR of a botnet with reference EDR given by the arithmetic
average of αˆ1 and αˆ2. A systematic way to select a proper intermediate value is substantially
more involved, and is the object of the forthcoming section.
A. Reference EDR by Replacement and Reassignment
Let us consider two (disjoint) subnets S1 and S2, with focus on the case that at least one
of them is composed only by normal users, with αˆS1 6= αˆS2 . Recall that we are considering a
fixed time t, and that the explicit dependence of all quantities upon t is suppressed for ease of
notation.
Since a botnet has common underlying EDR, and since we want to compare the behavior of
S1 ∪ S2 to that of a botnet, it would be useful to envisage a new pair of traffic patterns for S1
and S2 possessing the following characteristics:
i) The individual EDRs of S1 and S2 are equal, namely (superscript ′ refers to the “new” patterns),
αˆ′S1 = αˆ
′
S2
= αˆ′. (18)
ii) The transmission rate and the MIR of the network S1∪S2 coincide with those of the original
traffic patterns.
We now illustrate a Replacement and Reassignment (RR) procedure, which finds such a new
pair starting from the original pattern configuration. Such a procedure relies on the intuitive
consideration that, if some messages are reassigned from the subnet with highest EDR to the other
subnet, the resulting EDRs tend to keep closer each other. In order to avoid misunderstandings,
we remark that the RR procedure does not correspond to any real/physical operations made on
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Fig. 1. The RR procedure, pictorial exemplification.
the traffic patterns. The RR procedure is a conceptual experiment used to demonstrate that it is
possible to construct two patterns possessing the aforementioned requirements i) and ii).
The RR procedure goes as follows — see Fig. 1 for a pictorial illustration.
1. Replacement of repeated messages. The traffic pattern of a subnet S contains |DS| distinct
messages, the remaining NS − |DS| ones being repetitions of messages contained in DS. The
first step of the procedure amounts to replacing such NS − |DS| messages by one and the same
message, say it m∗, contained in DS. The replacement is applied to both subnets S1 and S2,
with the corresponding replacing messages being m∗1 and m
∗
2. Since replacement acts only on
the message content, the transmission rates do not change. Moreover, since replacement leaves
unaltered the number of distinct messages within each subnet, the MIR of the subnets, and the
MIR of S1 ∪ S2, are unaltered.4
2. Reassignment of messages. Some messages will be reassigned from one subnet to the other
subnet (only in one direction, namely, either from S2 to S1 or from S1 to S2). For the sake of
4The MIR is determined only by the content of the empirical dictionaries.
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clarity, assume that S2 is “passing” some of its messages to S1, with the prescription that the
replacing message m∗2 is never passed. Since, after replacement, all messages different from m
∗
2
appear only once in the pattern of S2, we see that all messages passed to S1 are necessarily
distinct. The rate of messages (number of messages normalized to the current time t) that are
reassigned from S2 to S1 is denoted by ∆. Accordingly, a negative ∆ will correspond to the
converse situation where S1 passes some of its messages to S2. As a result, the transmission
rates of the pattern configuration after reassignment are:
(λˆ′S1 , λˆ
′
S2
) = (λˆS1 + ∆, λˆS2 −∆). (19)
Moreover, since the correlation between the two patterns is weak (recall that one of the subnets
is composed only by normal users), we assume that it is always possible to reassign messages
that do not belong to the intersection of the two empirical dictionaries. Such assumption, along
with the fact that all passed messages are distinct, implies that, in terms of individual MIRs,
what is lost by a subnet is exactly gained by the other subnet. Formally:
(ρˆ′S1 , ρˆ
′
S2
) = (ρˆS1 + ∆, ρˆS2 −∆). (20)
Note that not all values of ∆ are admissible. For instance, if messages from S2 are reassigned
to S1, the rate of reassigned messages cannot exceed the rate of distinct messages owned by S2,
namely, ∆ ≤ ρˆS2 . Likewise, in the converse case, −∆ ≤ ρˆS1 , finally yielding:5
− ρˆS1 ≤ ∆ ≤ ρˆS2 . (21)
Moreover, since the reassignment changes only the “owner” of a given message, the MIR of the
aggregate network S1 ∪ S2 is left unaltered, namely, ρˆ′S1∪S2 = ρˆS1∪S2 .
3. Choice of ∆ for the equilibrium condition. At the end of the reassignment procedure, the
new EDRs corresponding to S1 and S2 become, respectively, αˆ′S1 = λˆ
′
S1
ρˆ′S1(λˆ
′
S1
− ρˆ′S1), and
αˆ′S2 = λˆ
′
S2
ρˆ′S2/(λˆ
′
S2
− ρˆ′S2), where we have exploited (10). In order to get a common reference
EDR αˆ′, we enforce the condition in (18), which, using (19) and (20) into the latter two equations,
amounts to seek a value ∆? such that:
αˆ′ =
(λˆS1 + ∆
?)(ρˆS1 + ∆
?)
λˆS1 − ρˆS1
=
(λˆS2 −∆?)(ρˆS2 −∆?)
λˆS2 − ρˆS2
, (22)
5 Actually, since we exclude the replacing messages m∗1 or m∗2 from the reassignment procedure, a subnet cannot pass all its
distinct messages. However, for large t the contribution of a single message becomes irrelevant.
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with the additional prescription that condition (21) is met. Therefore, the explicit formula for
∆? is found by solving a quadratic equation, and by simple algebra it can be verified that the
solution fulfilling (21) is:
∆? =
λˆS1λˆS2 − ρˆS1 ρˆS2
(λˆS1 − ρˆS1)− (λˆS2 − ρˆS2)
−
√
(λˆS1 − ρˆS1)(λˆS2 − ρˆS2)(λˆS1 + ρˆS2)(λˆS2 + ρˆS1)
(λˆS1 − ρˆS1)− (λˆS2 − ρˆS2)
.
(23)
From (22), it is easily verified that a positive ∆? corresponds to αˆS1 < αˆ
′ < αˆS2 (while the latter
two inequalities are reversed when ∆? < 0), implying that the subnet with the highest EDR
“passes” a fraction of its messages to the other subnet. In summary, we conclude that:
min(αˆS1 , αˆS2) ≤ αˆ′ ≤ max(αˆS1 , αˆS2) (24)
According to the above explanation, when at least one of the subnets is composed only by
normal users, we can write:
ρˆsum(S1, S2) , ρˆS1 + ρˆS2
(a)
= ρˆ′S1 + ρˆ
′
S2
(b)
= R(αˆ′, λˆ′S1) +R(αˆ
′, λˆ′S2)
(c)
> R(αˆ′, λˆ′S1 + λˆ
′
S2
)
(d)
= R(αˆ′, λˆS1 + λˆS2) , ρˆbot(S1, S2), (25)
where (a) follows from (20); (b) follows from (11); (c) follows from (7); and (d) follows
from (19). On the other hand, when S1 and S2 form a botnet, Theorem 1 implies that, for t large
enough, αˆS1 ≈ αˆS2 ≈ α, which in turn implies that αˆ′ ≈ α in view of (24). Therefore, in this
case the inequality ρˆsum(S1, S2) > ρˆbot(S1, S2) is justified by the approximations: ρˆsum(S1, S2) ≈
R(α, λS1) +R(α, λS2) and ρˆbot(S1, S2) ≈ R(α, λS1 + λS2).
We have in fact shown that, for arbitrary transmission schedulings and message-picking
policies, the empirical MIR of a botnet with reference EDR value (22) does always provide
a lower bound to the sum of individual MIRs.6
6We remark that the aforementioned result does not relate in any way to the deterministic or Poisson scheduling and to the
random message picking that characterize the class of DDoS attacks considered in the present work.
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Fig. 2. Time evolution of the empirical message innovation rate ρˆ (solid, black), compared to the identification threshold γ
(solid, red). For comparison purposes, the upper bound corresponding to the case of disjoint dictionaries, ρˆsum (dashed, green),
and the lower bound corresponding to the botnet case, ρˆbot (dashed, magenta) are displayed. Moving from left to right, the
different panels refer to i) the union of two normal users; ii) the union of a botnet of size 10 and a normal user; and iii) the
union of a botnet of size 10 and a bot.
B. Threshold Setting
Let us introduce an intermediate threshold lying between the lower bound and the upper bound
in (25), namely, for  ∈ (0, 1),
γ(S1, S2) = ρˆbot(S1, S2) +  [ρˆsum(S1, S2)− ρˆbot(S1, S2)] (26)
When S1 and S2 form a botnet, from Theorem 1 it is immediately seen (recall that αˆ′ will
converge to the true α) that ρˆS1∪S2 < γ(S1, S2) as t→∞.
When at least one of the subnets is made of normal users, the degree of dependence among
their patterns is low. Since i) we have shown that there exist two patterns, with common EDR, αˆ′,
and with the same joint properties (overall transmission rate and MIR) of the original patterns;
and ii) the RR procedure only replaces and/or reassigns messages, it is expected that the joint
MIR of a botnet with EDR αˆ′ is lower than ρˆS1∪S2 . Otherwise stated, it is reasonable to assume
that ρˆS1∪S2 , even if not coinciding with the upper bound ρˆsum(S1, S2) in (25), is still sufficiently
far from the lower bound ρˆbot(S1, S2). These considerations, for small , implicitly define the
following identification condition.
Botnet Identification Condition (BIC)
Let S1 and S2 be two subnets with S1
⋂
S2 = ∅. If at least one of the subnets is composed only
by normal users:
ρˆS1∪S2 ≥ γ(S1, S2) (27)
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We remark that the case of S1 arbitrary vs. S2 arbitrary is not dealt with. This is not unintentional,
since, as it will be clear from Theorem 2, the two situations discussed are sufficient to devise a
consistent botnet identification algorithm.
In summary, we end up with the following recipe:
S1 AND S2 contain only bots ⇒ ρˆS1∪S2 < γ(S1, S1), (28)
S1 OR S2 contain only normal users ⇒ ρˆS1∪S2 ≥ γ(S1, S1). (29)
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the significance of the BIC. The normal users’ activity refers to a
monitoring campaign conducted over real data. The bots’ activity has been generated according to
the model described in Sec. III. The details of such a campaign will be given in the forthcoming
section. In all the three panels we display: the empirical MIR, the threshold γ in (26), along
with its upper (ρˆsum) and lower (ρˆbot) bounds. An observation window of 2.5 min is considered.
All the relevant quantities are updated each 1 s, and both quantities are displayed as functions
of time, in the interval between 1 and 2.5 min.
In the leftmost panel, we address the case of a pair of normal users. We see that the MIR stays
(slightly) below the upper bound, meaning that a certain degree of correlation exists. However,
the MIR stands clear above the threshold, as prescribed by (29), and confirming the validity of
the BIC.
In the middle panel, the two subnets under test, S1 and S2, are a botnet of size 10, and a
normal user, respectively. Conclusions similar to those pertaining to a normal-normal pairing can
be drawn, substantiating again the BIC. We further see that, at the beginning of the observation
window, the activities of the two subnets are almost independent, i.e., the MIR essentially matches
the upper bound. As time elapses, a certain degree of correlation appears, but the MIR still stays
above the threshold.
Finally, in the rightmost panel, the case of a botnet/bot interaction is addressed. We see that
the empirical MIR: i) approaches, as time elapses, the quantity ρˆbot, in perfect agreement with
Theorem 1, and ii) stands clear below the threshold, in perfect agreement with (28).
In summary, the picture obtained from the above analysis reveals that the theoretical findings
of Theorem 1, as well as the conjectured behavior of the normal users implied by the BIC, are
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confirmed over real network traces.7
V. THE BOTBUSTER ALGORITHM
We now focus on the derivation of the inference algorithm aimed at disclosing a botnet possibly
hidden in the network. The BotBuster algorithm is described by the pseudo-code reported in the
right column above, and basically exploits the fact that, given two disjoint subnets, the BIC
allows to discriminate the situation where both subnets are part of a botnet, from the situation
where at least one of them is made of normal users. We shall show that the proposed algorithm
possesses the fundamental requirement of consistency, namely, the guarantee that the botnet is
correctly identified as t grows.
Let us examine how the algorithm works. First, note that a botnet made of one user, besides
making little sense in practice, is by definition non-identifiable, since we assumed that the
characteristics of the messages at a single-user level do not reveal any special information. Now,
at the beginning of the algorithm, user 1 is initially declared as a bot, namely, Bˆ = {1}. Then, it
is checked whether users 1 and 2 form a botnet. If so, Bˆ = {1, 2} is taken as the current botnet
estimate. If not, Bˆ = {1} is retained. Then, it is checked whether the currently estimated botnet
Bˆ forms a bot with user 3, and so on. At the end of the inner loop, the algorithm ends up with
an estimate Bˆ. If the cardinality of the estimated set is greater than one, it is taken as a current
estimate.
The procedure is then restarted by choosing user 2 as initial pivot, and sequentially checking
the remaining users as explained before. At the end of the inner loop, the algorithm ends up with
another estimate Bˆ. If the cardinality of the estimated set is greater than one and greater than the
cardinality of the previously estimated set8, then it is taken as a current estimate. Otherwise, the
previous estimate is retained. The procedure ends when all users have been scanned as pivots.
We see that, under the BIC, all checks performed by the algorithm will give eventually the
right answer, with probability tending to 1 as t → ∞. BotBuster is accordingly expected to
provide a consistent botnet estimator, as will be stated and proved in the forthcoming Theorem 2.
7Needless to say, our experiments have been repeated for many pairs of normal users, not reported here for obvious reasons.
8When t is large and the BIC is perfectly verified, the inner loop ends with either an empty set or the true botnet. Thus,
selecting the estimate with the highest cardinality might appear redundant. Such operation is instead useful when operating
under non-ideal conditions, as we shall explain soon.
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Algorithm 1: Bˆnew=BotBuster
N = {1, 2, . . . , N}; Bˆnew = ∅;
for b0 ∈ N do
Bˆ = {b0};
for j ∈ N \ {b0} do
if ρˆ(Bˆ ∪ {j}) < γ(Bˆ, {j}) then
Bˆ = Bˆ
⋃{j};
end
end
if |Bˆ| > max(1, |Bˆnew|) then
Bˆnew = Bˆ;
end
end
The algorithm complexity is O(N2) (only pairwise checks are performed), which is definitely
tolerable, since we are seeking, within a network of size N , a subset of unknown size that
matches some prescribed conditions. Finally, the looping structure of the algorithm makes it
naturally open to parallelization, which is especially important for large networks.
In order to quantify the algorithm performance, we need to choose some meaningful indicators.
With reference to a network N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, containing a botnet B, and letting Bˆ(t) be the
botnet estimated at time t by BotBuster, we introduce the following performance indices:
ηbot(t) =
E[|Bˆ(t) ∩B|]
|B| , ηnor(t) =
E[|Bˆ(t) ∩ (N \B)|]
|N \B| , (30)
namely, the expected fraction of correctly banned users (i.e., discovered bots), and the expected
fraction of incorrectly-banned users (i.e., normal users erroneously declared as bots). Clearly,
ηbot(t) (resp., ηnor(t)) is not defined when B = ∅ (resp., when B = N). We would like to see
ηbot(t) → 1, and ηnor(t) → 0 as t goes to infinity. Under the ideal assumption that the BIC is
always verified, such requirement is in fact fulfilled, as stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 2 (Consistency of BotBuster). Consider a network N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, containing
a botnet B, with |B| 6= 1, launching a randomized DDoS attack. The bots’ transmission policies
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are either synchronous with constant transmission rate, or independent Poisson processes, while
the normal users’ transmission policies are arbitrary. Then, for any finite emulation dictionary
rate α, the algorithm BotBuster is consistent, namely,
lim
t→∞
ηbot(t) = 1, lim
t→∞
ηnor(t) = 0 (31)
The claim for the case B = ∅ (resp., B = N) is intended to hold with reference solely to ηnor(t)
(resp., to ηbot(t)).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Theorem 2 reveals that the botnet estimated by BotBuster converges to the true one as time
elapses. The fundamental requirement enabling such result is the BIC validity. On the other
hand, in real-world applications, the assumption that the BIC is verified for all normal/normal
and botnet/normal interactions, as well as for all time epochs, is surely an over-idealized one.
It cannot be excluded that, occasionally, two independent users feature an unusual degree of
superposition between their empirical dictionaries, giving rise to spurious clusters of normal users
that might be erroneously included in the estimated botnet. What is expected to be true even
in real-world applications, is that such cases are rare and that the clusters’ cardinality is small.
Now, since the algorithm selects the estimate Bˆ with the highest cardinality, and since distributed
DoS attacks with small botnet sizes make little sense, estimated botnets of unreasonably small
cardinality should be easily ruled out by BotBuster. As a result, the final estimate is likely to
contain the true botnet, plus (possibly) a small fraction of normal users. Thus, even under non-
ideal operation conditions, it is expected that ηbot(t) → 1 as t → ∞, whereas ηnor(t) possibly
takes on some small value.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The theoretical analysis conducted in the previous sections relies upon a number of assump-
tions. As a result, when dealing with real network traces, and with challenging DDoS attacks,
the operational validity of the algorithm BotBuster is not at all obvious. This is why we have
performed a detailed experimental analysis, whose outcomes are now reported.
A popular e-commerce website has been selected as target destination of the attack. Clearly,
the normal users have no attacking intent, they perform ordinary surfing activity. About 20 min
of (application-layer) traffic have been collected, from 10 independent users, which were students
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and researchers working in our laboratory, and carrying on their surfing activity almost indepen-
dently. The collected streams have been partitioned into chunks of 2 min. In the forthcoming
analysis we take two perspectives. In one scenario, the number of normal users is 10, and, per
each trial, we choose 10 traces of 2 min, at random among the available traces. In the other
scenario, 2-min chunks belonging to the same user have been treated as if they were coming
from distinct users. In this way, we multiplied (fictitiously) the number of available normal users.
We stress that considering each chunk as an independent user is an approximation, but at the
same time such approximation introduces a spurious correlation among the users, which clearly
makes more challenging the botnet identification.
The DDoS attack has been generated so as to fall into the class described in Sec. III. Given
the dictionary of messages obtained from the whole activity recorded in the laboratory, it is
assumed that, at epoch t, only the first be0 + αtc messages of such a dictionary are available
to the botnet, giving rise to the emulation dictionary E (t), for fixed parameters e0 (size of
the dictionary at t = 0) and α. Then, independently at each bot, a Poisson time-scheduling is
randomly generated, and, per each transmission epoch t, each bot picks messages at random
from the currently available E (t).
We are now ready to examine the performance of our algorithm. We recall that our algorithm
is non-parametric, namely, that it does assume knowledge neither of the transmission rates, nor
of the parameters of the botnet emulation dictionary (e0 and α). In contrast, the size of the
network is obviously known. The only input parameter is the factor  appearing into (26). Our
experiments will serve to ascertain:
• The practical significance of the BIC over real data.
• The ability of BotBuster in discovering the hidden bots.
• The role of the algorithm parameters.
• The role of the botnet power (the learning ability α).
In Fig. 3, we consider a network made of 10 normal users, without bots. Therefore, the quantity
ηbot makes little sense, and is accordingly not displayed. The observation window lasts 2 min,
and the simulation points refer to the output of the algorithm taken each 1 s. The algorithm
is run for three values of the threshold parameter  ∈ (0, 1), namely, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2, and
the estimates are averaged over 100 Monte Carlo trials. Now, were the BIC exactly verified for
any subset of normal users, and for any time epoch, the fraction of banned users should be
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Fig. 3. Fraction of banned users as a function of time, for different values of the threshold parameter . The monitored network
is composed of 10 normal users, and contains no bots. The depicted curves are computed over 100 independent Monte Carlo
trials. Per each trial, 2-min chunks of each user are randomly selected among the available chunks.
always zero. As already discussed, in practice the BIC is expected to be verified approximately.
This notwithstanding, in Fig. 3 we see that the percentage of erroneously banned users is very
small for all the thresholds in the considered range, never exceeding 5%. Notably, such behavior
suggests that a BIC violation is unlikely to occur, and that, in any case, it involves small groups
of users.
In Fig. 4, the same analysis is repeated for the case that the network comprises 10 normal users
plus 10 bots. The botnet EDR is α = 10. We remark that such a value is compatible with some
of the empirical values αˆ estimated over the normal users’ traces. We see that the dashed curves
are in practice invisible, revealing that the estimated ηnor is almost zero for all the considered
values of . This behavior should be contrasted to what observed in Fig. 3, where, in the absence
of a botnet, the BIC was occasionally violated. However, as discussed at the end of Sec. V, the
spurious-and-small estimated clusters containing normal users can be efficiently ruled out by the
fact that the algorithm selects, as a final estimate, only the cluster with maximum size, which
is expected to contain only bots.
With regard to the fraction of correctly identified bots, we see that ηbot increases as  increases
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Fig. 4. Fraction of banned users as a function of time, for different values of the threshold parameter . The monitored network
is composed of 10 normal users, and contains B = 10 bots. Solid curves refer to correctly banned bots, whereas dashed curves
refer to erroneously banned normal users. The depicted curves are computed over 100 independent Monte Carlo trials. Per each
trial, 2-min chunks of each user are randomly selected among the available chunks.
from 0.05 to 0.2. In fact, increasing  makes it easier staying below the threshold, which facilitates
the inclusion of a node in the estimated botnet.
The analysis summarized in Fig. 4 reveals that the choice of the threshold is not critical, and
the algorithm offers excellent performance for a relatively large range of . Indeed, recall that
 ∈ (0, 1), and that  must be “small”, so that  = 0.05 up to 0.2 can be definitely considered a
“large”, flexible range.
In Fig. 5, the different curves refer to three EDR values (which, we recall, is not known to the
algorithm). The threshold parameter  was set to 0.2. Let us start by examining the behavior of
ηnor. We see that, irrespectively of the EDR value, ηnor stays approximately constant at 0, which
matches our previous evidences and observations.
Let us switch to the analysis of ηbot. The lowermost curve corresponds to the highest EDR
value considered in the figure, namely, to α = 50. Compared to what we have observed in the
real-network traces, such an EDR is a kind of relatively high value. We see that the average
percentage of correctly identified bots is relatively large (> 80%), even at the beginning of the
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Fig. 5. Fraction of banned users as a function of time, for different values of the EDR α. The monitored network is composed
of 10 normal users, and contains B = 10 bots. Solid curves refer to correctly banned bots, whereas dashed curves refer to
erroneously banned normal users. The depicted curves are computed over 100 independent Monte Carlo trials. Per each trial,
2-min chunks of each user are randomly selected among the available chunks.
monitoring activity. Then, the estimated ηbot increases, approaching unity as time elapses, in
perfect accordance with the theoretical results of Theorem 2.
Let us now move toward examining the incidence of the EDR on the algorithm performance.
We see that the curves corresponding to ηbot move upward as α decreases. This sounds perfectly
reasonable, since α quantifies the learning ability (i.e., the power) of the botnet. On the other
hand, for each value of α, the performance must eventually reach the limiting value of unity
after a sufficiently long time. In particular, the uppermost curve corresponds to the degenerate
case α = 0, namely, to the classical and well-documented case where the botnet uses repeatedly
the same patterns. As such, the case α = 0 could be addressed by other (simpler) tools, since a
normal user will seldom feature such a small innovation rate in practice. In summary, the above
analysis emphasizes that the performance decreases with the botnet learning ability α.
As last case, we consider the aforementioned scenario where the normal users are fictitiously
multiplied by treating distinct chunks of the same user as distinct users. In Fig. 6 we consider
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Fig. 6. Fraction of banned users as a function of time, for different botnet sizes B. The monitored network is composed of 50
normal users (“multiplied” scenario — see main text). Solid curves refer to correctly banned bots, whereas dashed curves refer
to erroneously banned normal users. The depicted curves are computed over 100 independent Monte Carlo trials. Per each trial,
2-min chunks of each user are randomly selected among the available chunks.
a network made of 50 normal users, for three cases, namely, B = 0, B = 10 and B = 50 bots.
The relevant EDR was set to α = 10, while the threshold parameter was set to the intermediate
value  = 0.2. In agreement with our previous evidences, even for such larger network, we see
that ηnor is very small when B = 0, and is in practice zero for B = 10, 50.
We see that ηbot increases with B. However, increasing B is expected to augment the botnet
“visibility”, but also the number of mistakes the algorithm can commit. Thus, the dependence of
the performance upon B is not obvious. In fact, other evidences collected during our experimental
campaign (not reported for space constraints), suggest that ηbot is not necessarily monotonically
increasing with B.
Finally, we stress that simulations were carried for networks up to 100 nodes. The algorithm
was able to guarantee the real-time requirement, yet with a standard laptop, with no careful
managing of memory and computational burden, and no code optimization, such issues being
beyond the scope of the work.
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APPENDIX A
In the following, the symbol o(gn) will denote a function such that o(gn)/gn → 0 as n→∞.
Also, when convenient for notational reasons, the expectation of X is denoted by X¯ .
PROPOSITION 1 (Useful recursion). Let a, c > 0, b ∈ R, n ∈ N, ηn = 1− 1/(c + an), and
fn = ηn fn−1 + b. We have:
fn = f0
n∏
`=1
η` + b
(
1 +
n∑
k=2
n∏
`=k
η`
)
, (32)
or:
fn = f0
n∏
`=1
η` +
ab
1 + a
[
n+
(
1 +
c
a
)(
1−
n∏
`=1
η`
)]
, (33)
and the following limit holds:
lim
n→∞
fn
n
=
ab
1 + a
(34)
Proof. First, observe that:
f1 = f0η1 + b, f2 = f0η1η2 + b(1 + η2), . . . (35)
which yields (32) by recursion. Let now fˆn denote the RHS in (45). By the induction principle,
the claim in (45) will be proved if we show that f1 = fˆ1, and that
fn = fˆn ⇒ fn+1 = fˆn+1 (36)
Making explicit the definition of η1 where needed, we have:
fˆ1 = η1f0 +
ab
1 + a
(1 + 1/a) = η1f0 + b = f1. (37)
Assuming now that fn = fˆn, we can write
fn+1 = ηn+1 fˆn + b = f0
n+1∏
`=1
η` − ab
1 + a
(
1 +
c
a
) n+1∏
`=1
η`
+
ab
1 + a
(
n+ 1 +
c
a
)(
1− 1
c+ a(n+ 1)
)
+ b︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ab
1+a [n+1+(1+
c
a)]
= fˆn+1.
(38)
Finally, the claim in (34) follows by observing that the term
∏n
`=1 η` in (33), vanishes as n→
∞. 
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COROLLARY 1 (Small perturbations). Let a, b > 0, n ∈ N, and let fn be a nonnegative
sequence such that:
fn ≤ fn−1
(
1− 1
an+ o(n)
)
+ b+ o(1). (39)
Then:
lim sup
n→∞
fn
n
≤ ab
1 + a
. (40)
If the inequality in (39) is reversed, the constant b can be relaxed to be an arbitrary real number,
and:
lim inf
n→∞
fn
n
≥ ab
1 + a
. (41)
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove (40). In the following,  > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
For n large enough, and for all c ∈ R, we have:
0 < 1−
(
1
an+ o(n)
)
≤ 1− 1− 
c+ an
. (42)
Moreover, we have b+ o(1) ≤ b+ . Since fn is nonnegative by assumption, a certain n0 exists,
such that, for all n > n0:
fn ≤ fn−1
(
1− 1− 
c+ an
)
+ b+ . (43)
Introducing, for m = 1, 2, . . . , the definition
ηm = 1− 1− 
c+ a(n0 +m)
= 1− 1c+an0
1− +
a
1− m
. (44)
from (43) we get, by recursion:
fn0+m ≤ fn0
m∏
`=1
η` + (b+ )
(
1 +
m∑
k=2
m∏
`=k
η`
)
. (45)
In view of (44), Proposition 1 allows to conclude that:
lim sup
n→∞
fn
n
≤
a
1−(b+ )
1 + a
1−
, (46)
and, hence, the claim in (40) follows from arbitrariness of . 
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we prove the claim for the synchronous scheduling, where all bots
transmit regularly at intervals of constant duration τ = 1/λ. Accordingly, we consider a slotted
system with discrete time index n ≥ 0, and introduce the quantities:
Dn , DB(nτ), Mn , |Dn|, En , E (nτ), en , |En|, (47)
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where we further observe that:
lim
n→∞
en
nτ
= α⇒ en = ατ n+ o(n). (48)
Now, for the synchronous case, it suffices to show that:
Mn
nτ
p−→ αBλ
α +Bλ
⇔ Mn
n
p−→ ατ B
ατ +B
, ρ, (49)
where B is the cardinality of subnet B. Observe preliminarily that, by the orthogonality principle,
we can write:
E
[(
Mn
n
− ρ
)2]
= E
[(
Mn − M¯n
n
)2]
+
(
M¯n
n
− ρ
)2
, (50)
and, since mean-square convergence implies convergence in probability [22], it suffices to show
that, as n→∞, both terms on the RHS in (50) vanish.9 We start by showing that M¯n/n→ ρ.
At time n, the probability that k bots out of B pick a message outside Dn−1 is (conditionally
on Mn−1): (
B
k
)(
1− Mn−1
en
)k (
Mn−1
en
)B−k
. (51)
Let us introduce the binomial random variable Xˆn, with probability mass function given by (51),
whose (conditional) expectation and variance are:
E[Xˆn|Mn−1] = B
(
1− Mn−1
en
)
, (52)
and
VAR[Xˆn|Mn−1] = B
(
1− Mn−1
en
)
Mn−1
en
. (53)
In order to build Dn, we must select all the distinct messages among the k available ones.
Ignoring repetitions, we can write:
Mn ≤Mn−1 + Xˆn, (54)
and, taking expectations:
M¯n ≤ M¯n−1
(
1− 1
ατn/B + o(n)
)
+B, (55)
9In fact, we prove a stronger result in terms of mean-square convergence.
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having used (52) and the expression of en appearing on the RHS in (48). Direct application of
Corollary 1 now yields:
lim sup
n→∞
M¯n
n
≤ ατ B
ατ +B
. (56)
Let us now prove the above (reversed) inequality for the lim inf. To this aim, we split En into
C non-overlapping cells:
En =
C⋃
c=1
Ec,n,
⌊ |En|
C
⌋
≤ |Ec,n| ≤
⌊ |En|
C
⌋
+ 1, (57)
where C is an arbitrary integer. Since we focus on the regime where n → ∞, it can be safely
assumed that the initial number of words in the emulation dictionary obeys: e0 ≥ C. Let now:
Dn =
C⋃
c=1
Dc,n, Mc,n , |Dc,n|, Mn =
C∑
c=1
Mc,n, (58)
and the events, for j = 1, 2, . . . , B, and c = 1, 2, . . . , C:
Aj,c , {bot j picks a message belonging to Ec,n \Dc,n−1}. (59)
Then we have, for any j:
P[Aj,c|Mc,n−1] = |Ec,n| −Mc,n−1|En| , pc,n, (60)
with the dependence of pc,n upon Mc,n−1 being suppressed for ease of notation. From (57), we
have:
1
C
− 1
en
− Mc,n−1
en
≤ pc,n ≤ 1
C
+
1
en
− Mc,n−1
en
. (61)
Now, Mc,n−1 increases by at least 1 whenever at least one bot picks a new message belonging
to the c-th cell. This implies:
E[Mc,n|Mc,n−1] ≥Mc,n−1 +Bpc,n − (Bpc,n)2, (62)
where we used the inequality (1− p)B ≤ 1− Bp + (Bp)2. On the other hand, for large n and
small  > 0, from (61), we get p2c,n ≤ (1/C + 1/en)2 ≤ C−2 + , and, hence, from (62):
E[Mc,n|Mc,n−1] ≥Mc,n−1 +Bpc,n −
(
B
C
)2
− ′, (63)
for a certain small ′. Conversely, using the lower bound in (61), and averaging over Mc,n−1, for
large n we get:
M¯c,n ≥ M¯c,n−1
(
1− B
en
)
+
B
C
(
1− B
C
)
− ′′, (64)
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Bˆ1 = {1}, E2 =
{
ρˆBˆ1∪{2} < γ(Bˆ1, {2})
}
, E3 =
{
ρˆBˆ2∪{3} < γ(Bˆ2, {3})
}
, . . . EB =
{
ρˆBˆB−1∪{B} < γ(BˆB−1, {B})
}
,
EB+1 =
{
ρˆBˆB∩{B+1} ≥ γ(BˆB, {B + 1})
}
, . . . EN =
{
ρˆBˆB∩{N} ≥ γ(BˆB, {N})
}
. (74)
for a certain small ′′. Summing over c, we get:
M¯n ≥ M¯n−1
(
1− B
en
)
+B
(
1− B
C
)
− C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
= M¯n−1
(
1− 1
ατ/B + o(n)
)
+ b, (65)
having used en in (48). Invoking now Corollary 1, we obtain:
lim inf
n→∞
M¯n
n
≥ ατ b
ατ +B
≥ ατ B
ατ +B
, (66)
where the latter inequality follows from the definition of b, since C and  are arbitrary. Equa-
tion (66), along with (56), yields that the second term on the RHS in (50) vanishes. Let us switch
to the first term in (50). In view of the ascertained convergence of expectations, the variance
will be proved to vanish if we show that: E[M2n]/n2 → ρ2. Now, in the light of (54), we can
write: E[M2n|Mn−1] ≤ M2n−1 + E[Xˆ2n|Mn−1] + 2Mn−1E[Xˆn|Mn−1], which, using (52) and (53),
yields:
vn ≤ vn−1n− 1
n
[
1− 2B
en
+
B(B − 1)
e2n
]
+ B
M¯n−1
n
(
2− 2B − 1
en
)
+
B2
n
, (67)
having also introduced the definition vn , E[M2n]/n. Now, the first term appearing on the RHS
can be represented as
vn−1
(
1− 1ατ
ατ+2B
n+ o(n)
)
. (68)
Likewise, the second term appearing on the RHS in (67) can be written as 2Bρ+o(1). Applying
Corollary 1, we get:
lim sup
n→∞
E[M2n]
n2
= lim sup
n→∞
vn
n
≤ 2Bρ
ατ
ατ+2B
1 + ατ
ατ+2B
= ρ2. (69)
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Now, subadditivity of limit superior implies:
lim sup
n→∞
E
[(
Mn − M¯n
n
)2]
≤ lim sup
n→∞
E[M2n]
n2
+ lim sup
n→∞
(
−M¯
2
n
n2
)
≤ 0, (70)
with the latter inequality coming from (69), and from M¯n/n→ ρ. The claim for the synchronous
case is so proved.
With regard to the Poisson case, we consider again the slotted system in (47), but for the
fact that τ is now an arbitrarily small interval. The number of transmission attempts in a single
slot, A, is now a Poisson random variable with expectation A¯ =
∑
u∈B λuτ = λBτ . Since the A
transmissions correspond to A independent choices of messages from the emulation dictionary,
for small τ the system behaves as if we had A synchronous bots, where A is now random. Thus,
the proof for the Poisson case boils down to modify slightly the previous proof in order to take
into account such additional randomness. Specifically, Eq. (55) should be modified by considering
a random number of bots A, and then taking expectations, yielding:10 M¯n ≤ M¯n−1(1−A¯/en)+A¯.
Likewise, Eq. (62) becomes: E[Mc,n|Mc,n−1] ≥Mc,n−1 + 1−E[(1−pc,n)A|Mn−1]. Since, for the
Poisson random variable A, it is easy to show that E[(1− p)A] = e−A¯p ≤ 1− A¯p + (A¯p)2, the
conclusion in (49) still holds true, with B simply replaced by A¯. Finally, the inequality in (67)
becomes:
vn ≤ vn−1n− 1
n
[
1− 2A¯
en
+
A(A− 1)
e2n
]
+
M¯n−1
n
(
2A¯− A(2A− 1)
en
)
+ A2. (71)
Having shown that all the equations used to prove the pertinent convergence hold true with B
replaced by A¯, we conclude that: Mn
n
p−→ ατ A¯
ατ+A¯
= αλB
α+λB
. 
APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us focus on a single step of the BotBuster loop, i.e., the algorithm
behavior for a fixed b0. Consider first the case that b0 is a normal user, and introduce, for
10We implicitly use: i) the independence between scheduling policy and message picking, and ii) the memoryless property
of the Poisson process.
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j ∈ N \ {b0}, the events:
Ej = {ρˆ{b0}∪{j} ≥ γ({b0}, {j})}. (72)
Eq. (29) reveals that, for any j, P[Ej]→ 1 as t→∞. But we also have that, for b0 normal,
P[inner loop outputs Bˆ = {b0}] = P[∩j∈N\{b0}Ej]→ 1, (73)
where the convergence follows by the fact that each of the events has probability converging to
one as t→∞.
In contrast, if b0 is a bot, we distinguish two cases: i) if j is normal, from (29) we conclude
that ρˆ{b0}∪{j} ≥ γ({b0}, {j}) with probability converging to one as t → ∞, while ii) if j is a
bot, from (28) we conclude that ρˆ{b0}∪{j} < γ({b0}, {j}) with probability converging to one as
t→∞. Assume now, without loss of generality, that the first B users are bots, that b0 = 1, and
that the remaining users are normal. In (74), we introduce the events corresponding to the inner
loop over index j, as well as the associated botnet estimates at step j, denoted by Bˆj . After
noticing that, in the definition of these events, the inequality signs in the threshold comparisons
are different for j ≤ B and for j > B, it is seen that the event Bˆ = {1, 2, . . . , B} corresponds to
the event ∩Nj=2Ej . Since, in view of the above points i) and ii), we have P[Ej]→ 1, we conclude
that (if b0 = 1 is a bot):
P[inner loop outputs Bˆ = {1, 2, . . . , B}] = P[∩Nj=2Ej]→ 1, (75)
which implies the validity of (31). 
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